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Abstract 
 
During the first three decades after 1947 India saw economic growth at only 3% 
but a vast expansion of the infrastructure for science and technology.  In later decades, in 
particular during the last few years, the economy has grown much faster, but the S&T 
system has not experienced the transformation that business and industry have.  The net 
result is that the public sector S&T system is facing a major crisis even as the private 
sector contributes little to the national R&D effort.  Wealth generation in the country by 
private S&T services, most familiarly in Information Technology, has led to greater 
prosperity for the educated middle-class, but has also led to greater inequalities in 
income.  The national scene is generally one of uneven achievement and extraordinary 
potential. It is argued that unless another major shift in S&T policy occurs in the country, 
there is a real danger that India will not go beyond being a blue-collar S&T power in the 
world. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In 1947 – with the end of British rule imminent – Jawaharlal Nehru prophesied to 
the Indian Science Congress [1] that  
 
  as soon as we get over our present troubles, there will be a flowering of 
science and other activities in India which will probably astonish the world. 
 
Sixty years after that speech, it is legitimate to ask: has the world been astonished by 
what India has done? 
 
In its issue of 13 August 2007, Time magazine answered: ‘the world’s largest 
democracy is living up to the dreams of 1947’.  As far as the economy is concerned, 
some 25 years ago it breached what had been called the Hindu rate of growth (of about 
3%), and is today growing about thrice as fast.  Indian businessmen are making waves 
around the world, acquiring foreign assets in what even a few years ago would have been 
inconceivable scenarios. And there are now more billionaires (in dollar terms) in India 
than in any other Asian country.  As a kid I had been taught that the Nizam of Hyderabad 
was the fourth richest man in the world. The position is once again occupied by an Indian 
– this time by an industrial rather than a feudal baron [2].  At the same time about 25% of 
_________________________________ 
This is a preprint of a paper that has appeared in the special issue of Technology in Society on China, India 
and the United States: Assessments and Comparisons, 2008, 30:330-338, without the note on recommended 
action included at the end of the present script . 
 2 
the population lives below the poverty line according to the Government of India, and 
many more according to others.  
 
 Turning to science and technology (S&T), economists suggest [3] that about half 
of economic growth in industrialized countries is due to technical factors. What role have 
such technical factors played in India’s economic growth?  The question demands a far 
more elaborate analysis than this essay can give.  On the one hand, western media are full 
of stories about how S&T jobs are being lost to India (and China), how India is one of the 
best platforms in the world to do high-tech R&D (as Business Week said a few years ago) 
and so many multinationals (MNCs) decide to shift large chunks of their R&D to India, 
how the engineering graduates from the IITs (the Indian Institutes of Technology) are 
among the best in the world, how India has built a prolific, world class space programme 
on a ‘shoestring’ budget (according to Aviation Week and Space Technology), and so on. 
On the other hand stories about the ineffectiveness of Indian public S&T, the large cost 
and time over-runs on national projects, the pathetic state of most of our universities and 
the poor quality of their graduates fill the pages of the national media.   
 
So what is the truth?  The simple fact of the matter is that, compared to any other 
major nation with ambitions in S&T, India’s performance is singularly uneven.  The best 
in the country is often about as good as anywhere else in the world, but the worst is poor; 
tall peaks tower over a low average. The scene is thus full of stark contrasts: the richest 
and the poorest, the brightest and the darkest live side by side, but in a milieu where 
expectations are now rising fast. In Jeffrey Sachs’s classification, India is divided into 
technologically adaptive and technologically excluded regions, the dividing line running 
approximately north west to south east across the middle of the country; no part of India 
is still technologically innovative.  So the picture is mixed, but amidst the contrasts one 
can see how an ancient civilization is transforming itself – in its own way, at its own 
pace. 
 
 What this essay attempts is an examination of how science and technology in 
India have influenced and in turn been influenced by economic policy and strategic 
considerations.  We do this by taking a broad historical view. Within the short length of 
this essay it will be difficult to cover all aspects of the subject, so I shall pay greater 
attention to those areas of S&T with which I am more familiar. Thus I will spend more 
time on aerospace, both because of my own experience with it and because the space 
sector provides a striking illustration of a particularly successful public sector technology 
development programme, unlike its aeronautical cousin which has a different dynamic 
altogether. Sectors other than aerospace, e.g. agriculture, steel, electronics, nuclear 
energy, also grew in the same period and have their own special characteristics, but they 
are beyond the scope of the present essay. 
 
 It is convenient to divide post-independence developments into three phases. In 
the first, lasting about three decades, a vast S&T infrastructure was built up as part of a 
socialistic effort to transform the country.  Between 1980 and 2000 the economy began to 
be liberalized, creation of wealth began to be perceived as a worthwhile and respectable 
goal, and the private sector slowly began to assume a larger role in the scheme of things. 
In the new century the reforms have been more widely accepted and more vigorously 
pursued, and the accompanying rapid growth of the economy and of a consumerist class 
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has had a strong but unexpected impact on the Indian S&T system, which has not yet 
quite adapted itself to these changes.  The current scene is full of paradoxes, and the 
future should be interesting. 
 
2. The early decades after Independence 
 
The origins of the current science and technology system in India can be traced to 
the establishment of the first scientific agencies that the British found necessary to 
manage and expand their Indian empire in the 18th and 19th centuries.  The Survey of 
India goes back to 1767, and the India Meteorological Department to 1875. Several of 
these agencies grew under some outstanding British leaders who (working with Indian 
assistants) left enduring imprints on their disciplines and on the organizations they 
headed (e.g. Sir Gilbert Walker in meteorology, Sir Ronald Ross in health). The 
establishment of institutes for carrying out more general scientific research or technology 
development in modern terms was more difficult. The landmarks here were usually due 
to Indian enterprise rather than British patronage.  For example the Indian Association for 
the Cultivation of Science was established in Calcutta in 1876 by a remarkable doctor, 
Mahendra Lal Sircar. The Indian Institute of Science at Bangalore, whose establishment 
was resisted by British commercial interests for many years, finally started operating 
around 1909 as a result of a unique three-party agreement between the commercial house 
of Tatas, the Maharaja of Mysore and the British Viceroy’s government.  Beginning in 
the 1930s, the Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Subhash Chandra Bose, started planning for science and industry, almost as if in 
anticipation of the times when they would be able to make and execute national policy 
under their own government.  British policy during and between the two world wars 
faced the difficult problem of striking a balance between responding to the demands of 
prosecuting war in distant colonies cut-off from Britain and ensuring that no 
commercially or militarily sensitive technology became available to the ‘natives’.  
Meanwhile many Indian scientists, most notably C V Raman, S Ramanujan, M N Saha 
and J C and S N Bose, made international reputations from their strikingly original 
scientific work.  Basic science, rather than technology or economics, was in fact a major 
cultural force that changed the country’s perception of itself and its people’s abilities. 
 
 It is against this background that one can understand how the advent of self-rule 
saw an immediate and dramatic increase in the attention devoted to science and 
technology. In 1946, the highly regarded Indian political leader C. Rajagopalachari was 
already presiding over the governing body of CSIR (Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research), which had been set up in 1942, incidentally under pressure and even with 
offers of support from technology-starved Indian business interests [4].  CR (as he was 
known) joked with the scientists, hoping that they ‘will look upon us [politicians] as one 
of those many natural forces you have got to cope with’.  On 23 August, barely a week 
after he had taken over as Prime Minister of an independent India that was burning in the 
fires of a disastrous partition, Nehru called for an inter-ministerial meeting on science [4]. 
Nehru had taken the tripos in natural science at Cambridge, and used to speak 
nostalgically of the days when he haunted its laboratories.  He looked upon science, and a 
‘scientific temper’, as the solution to the problems ‘of a rich country inhabited by 
starving people’.  He declared that it would have been better for him to be ‘the Director 
of this [the National Physical] Laboratory, if I had the competence, than to be the Prime 
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Minister’.    The agnostic pandit reserved his sacred rituals for a new god: he liked ‘to 
burn incense at the altar of science’, and saw dams and factories as modern temples. He 
considered scientists and engineers more important than administrators and lawyers, and 
dismissed businessmen as unlikely to play a part in national development ‘because of 
their limited outlook’. In 1958 he had Parliament pass a scientific policy resolution, 
which said in part that ‘it was an inherent obligation of a great country like India with its 
tradition, scholarship and original thinking and its great cultural heritage to participate 
fully in modern science, which is probably mankind’s greatest enterprise today’.  Science 
and technology, therefore, were tools with which Nehru was going to transform a 
civilization in distress. 
 
 For about thirty years the public science and technology system that Nehru and 
his scientist collaborators like the nuclear physicist Homi Bhabha and the chemist S S 
Bhatnagar built seemed like a model for the developing world.  The Atomic Energy 
Commission was established in 1948, and the civilian CSIR and the Defence Research 
and Development Organization grew dramatically in the 1950s and 60s.  In education the 
IIT system was established, and the Indian Institute of Science and the Tata Institute of 
Fundamental Research grew substantially.    
 
Nehru advocated a socialistic pattern of society, choosing this diluted term 
presumably to signal that the country’s economy (unlike its science [1]) was not going to 
be completely state-run.  The economy remains mixed to this day, although the 
proportions between private and public have varied over time.   Given his opinion of 
Indian business it was natural that his government set up several modern industries in the 
public sector. These included machine tools, electronics, heavy electrical machinery, 
telephones, aircraft, airlines and many others.  
 
 Further initiatives were taken in public sector S&T by Nehru’s successors (Nehru 
passed away in 1964), in particular Mrs. Indira Gandhi (who was Prime Minister for two 
terms, 1966-77, 1980-84).  One of these had to do with agriculture.  The experience of 
the mid 60s when India was forced to import large quantities of food grains (and, as the 
saying went, live from ship to mouth), demonstrated that food security had become a 
major problem.  With the assistance of the US in particular, a green revolution was 
ushered in, and adequate food stocks were created and maintained to be able to tide over 
bad monsoon years.  The food problem that had plagued India for centuries was solved in 
about a decade. 
 
 The other major development was that several new science departments were set 
up in the central government. These included the departments of science and technology, 
biotechnology, non-conventional (now renewable) energy sources, ocean development 
(now part of earth sciences), scientific and industrial research, and perhaps most 
significantly, space.  As a remarkable indicator of national potential, space deserves some 
special attention. 
 
3. The space programme 
 
 The space programme started in June 1972 as a project in the Department of 
Atomic Energy.  Space has now become the most heavily supported civilian S&T 
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programme in the country: in the Tenth Five-Year Plan it accounted for nearly $ 2.6 B (at 
Rs.45/$), constituting 45% of the Plan budget [5] of the six major S&T Departments of 
the Government of India (excluding Defence).  The father of the programme, Vikram 
Sarabhai, came from a well-known and wealthy family of businessmen and industrialists 
in Gujarat, but science was his career of choice; Mahatma Gandhi was a close family 
friend.  When I first met Sarabhai in 1963 at Trivandrum, two things struck me: the Nike-
Apache launch from the beautiful palm-fringed beaches of Kerala in south-west India, 
and the company Sarabhai was travelling with.  It included not only some of the 
engineers and scientists who were then working with him, but also artists, dancers, 
journalists, and a group of distinguished foreign scientists (science was again a part of 
culture for him).  Sarabhai insisted that India was not doing space for prestige, and, like a 
good businessman, suggested that sound economic evaluation of the required resources 
was necessary before embarking on the programme. He saw an opportunity in space 
science and technology for India to leap-frog from its backwardness and poverty.  Having 
trained as a physicist who used balloons for cosmic ray work, it was natural for him to 
think of sounding rockets as another tool that would help his research.  The first rockets 
launched in Trivandrum had to do with the upper atmosphere and the so-called electro-
jet, a huge river of electric current that flows over the southern tip of India.  Later the 
achievement of societal goals became the primary force driving the emerging space 
programme. 
 
Unfortunately Sarabhai died when he was only 52.  He was succeeded by Satish 
Dhawan, who set up a space establishment in the country that would realize Sarabhai’s 
dreams. In 1972 this establishment took shape in the form of a Space Commission (a high 
level policy-making body), a Department of Space (part of the Government’s 
administrative machinery) and ISRO, the Indian Space Research Organization (the 
technical executing arm) – a system that borrowed its structure (with some modifications) 
from the one devised by Homi Bhabha for atomic energy.  In succeeding years ISRO 
went on to become a superb technology delivery system.  Dhawan was also keenly 
sensitive to social and environmental issues; even as he led big science he showed great 
respect for little science.  (So it was no wonder that he found bird-watching at the 
Sriharikota Range relaxing, and wrote a little gem of a book about bird flight.)  
 
 Pursuing the original vision, the ISRO programme eventually led to a series of 
satellites for communication, meteorology, broadcasting, natural resource surveys, 
education, and more recently cartography, telemedicine, ocean resources etc. Strong 
commitment to developmental goals kept space away from anything connected with 
defence.  In 1975-76 ISRO used the US satellite ATS-6 for a Satellite Instructional 
Television Experiment (SITE) which broadcast a series of educational TV programmes 
on health, family planning, agriculture and related subjects to more than 2,500 villages in 
the country – and in many different languages. For its time (and perhaps to this day), 
SITE was the largest societally motivated experiment ever conducted in the world using 
space technology. 
 
 The visionary commitment of the founding fathers slowly got translated into 
reality. On 19 April 1975 India’s first satellite called Aryabhata was launched from the 
Soviet Union, and on 18 April 1980 the Rohini satellite was launched by India’s own 
launch vehicle SLV-3 from the Sriharikota Range.  Since then there have been more than 
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fifty satellites, of which about half are Indian launches, some into low-earth and others on 
geostationary orbits.  Around ten have been launched for foreign customers [6].  With the 
recent successes of the polar (PSLV) and geostationary (GSLV) satellite launch vehicles, 
the country now has a robust capability to launch satellites of 3-ton class into 
geostationary orbits, and has achieved the objectives it set for itself twenty years ago.  A 
lunar orbiter is scheduled for launch in 2008.  All of this has been achieved on a budget 
which over twenty five years has grown to about $ 1 B (annual) currently. 
 
 What the space and some other programmes have thus shown is that, given the 
will, both technical and managerial skills are available in the country for running 
complex S&T enterprises, and even achieve societal goals in large measure [7].  
 
4. The economic reforms 
 
During the thirty-year socialistic period the 3% growth of the economy was not 
much higher than that of population, so the country was not getting much more 
prosperous.  Towards the end of the period it was however probably more secure – not 
only in food. After the Bangladesh war and the 1974 Pokhran nuclear test, and the 
extensive industrial infrastructure that had been built up, a certain threshold of strategic 
autonomy had once again been recovered [8] since the 1962 debacle against China and 
the 1964 Chinese nuclear test.  Development, which had followed a low-slow-steady 
approach (with low investments sustained over long periods), was visible but not 
spectacular [9].  It had turned out bright young people at the central institutes, but many 
of them began to go abroad and stayed there, reaping rewards for their contributions that 
were inconceivable back home. 
 
All these factors combined to provoke the country to reexamine the philosophical 
roots of its economic policy.  The visible and dramatic gains made by its south east Asian 
neighbours around that time and by China sometime later, adopting a model of growth 
that was seen as more pragmatic, could not be ignored.  Changes in economic policy 
were accelerated by the advent of a young Prime Minister in Rajiv Gandhi, who (as a 
former airline pilot) was at home in modern technology.  During his short tenure (1984-
89) he advocated the wide use of computers and talked about building an India for the 
21st century. Although his vision of the future did not gather much immediate support, 
there can be no doubt that it shook the country up.   
 
In retrospect we can now see that, starting around 1980 an economic liberalization 
had been initiated without any fanfare, and the rate of growth of GDP went up to nearly 
6% and stayed there for another two decades [10].  However in 1991 a balance of 
payments crisis led to a more explicitly articulated reform regime. Although at first 
resisted by both leftist political forces and Indian business interests, the positive aspects 
of change soon became so evident that in recent years the policy has ceased to be 
questioned.   
 
 During this period, once again in retrospect, no major initiatives in public S&T, of 
the kind that had characterized the earlier decades, seem to have been taken. There was 
however considerable consolidation. Businessmen entered government councils and 
public sector boardrooms – to the dismay of the socialists. Fundamental questions about 
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the way that the S&T system was run began to be asked. There was a major review of 
CSIR, and constant questioning about why Indian S&T needs to keep reinventing the 
wheel. The period did produce some tension, but at the same time brought into open 
questions that had remained publicly unarticulated for a long time. 
 
In aerospace, that consolidation also saw the initiation of the Light Combat 
Aircraft (LCA) project and maturing of the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH).  The LCA 
has not yet entered service and is unlikely to do so for another few years, but there is an 
order for twenty from the Indian Air Force.  And the ALH, now named Dhruv, has been 
certified in several variants and seems to have established itself as a very useful product 
of the aircraft industry.  Space and atomic energy continued with their programmes, the 
former with development of the early satellite launch vehicles and the design and 
manufacture of a series of remote sensing and other satellites, the latter with more nuclear 
power stations and a second round of nuclear test explosions in 1998. 
 
The most striking development of these decades, however, was the unforeseen 
and spectacular growth of the IT services industry, which had never figured in the official 
five-year plans.  Not many would have predicted that computers would so rapidly affect 
virtually all walks of life, or that making the right software could prove to be a major 
global challenge. Even fewer people could have imagined a rewarding opportunity for 
India to emerge seemingly out of nowhere, so to speak, to provide the world with a huge, 
unsuspected reservoir of technical talent that would become a source of excellent 
software skills. 
 
 Although the IT phenomenon owed little directly to the government, it would be 
only fair to recognize that it was rendered possible by the vast expansion of S&T 
education (even if of highly variable quality) in earlier decades, and the popularization of 
computers by a young Prime Minister. Before the 1980s the major employer of 
outstanding graduates in S&T was the public sector – research institutes, national 
laboratories, high-end (public sector) industry etc. The new opportunities unveiled by the 
computer revolution were often seized by those who learnt some basic skills at one of the 
roadside computer schools that began mushrooming in cities like Bangalore. It is 
impossible to resist the temptation to attribute at least part of this phenomenon to a 
cultural advantage that Indians derived from their own classical science. That the numeral 
system that is internationally used today can be traced to India is well known.  Perhaps 
not so well known is the fact that the computational power unleashed by the new system 
led to an extraordinary flowering of numerical mathematics between the third and 
sixteenth centuries in India. This came to be known in the west only through contacts 
with the Arabs in the early centuries of the second millennium.  The primacy given to 
number in India, in combination with Indian appreciation of linguistics and grammar as 
primary sciences, suddenly became relevant to the creation of modern software.  (So 
there was a point to the mention of cultural heritage in the 1958 scientific policy 
resolution.) 
 
5. The new century 
 
With the recent spurt in growth rate to the neighbourhood of about 9%, GDP is 
now about a trillion dollars, and pictures of India rising or shining have been constantly 
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projected before the world, leading to an unprecedented bullishness about the Indian 
economy.  The changes that have occurred in the business scene are indeed striking. The 
country has a healthy foreign exchange reserve, raising capital has become easier; 
population growth has slowed down.   The economic reforms have been embraced across 
the political spectrum including the leftist governments in power in a few states. The 
emergence of the call-centre and BPO sectors has led to worries about lost US jobs. 
Although that loss is minute, reports about how US workers are worried about being 
‘Bangalored’, as the phrase went, changed the way that both Indians and Americans 
looked at economic reforms and globalization.  Indeed, to this long-time resident of 
Bangalore, it is clear that the recent prosperity of the city is due to these changes in the 
economy – although many of us are dismayed at the price that the city has paid in terms 
of pollution, congestion and a failing infrastructure for what is still largely selective 
prosperity. 
 
 Given the new growth rate, personal income in India should make it a middle 
income country around the 2020s. Many leaders, and in particular the last President Dr 
Abdul Kalam, have held up as a viable national target its transformation to a developed 
nation by 2020. Whether this will happen will in part depend on the definition of 
‘development’.  If there is no major political, military or financial upheaval, and Europe 
is not going to be counted as a single unit, the Indian economy will in all likelihood be 
the third largest in the world before 2020.  
 
 The effects of the growth in the services sector in the new century are very 
visible. In the late 80s we were promised that the waiting time for telephone connections 
would be reduced from three years to two by 2000, and that the fraction of the population 
possessing telephones would go up from 2 to 3%.  Thanks in part to the opening of the 
telecommunication sector to private enterprise, and to dramatic changes in technology 
through mobile telephony (with 200M mobiles in the country now) telephones are no 
longer the possession of a privileged class.  Similarly television now reaches more than 
90% of the population.  Air traffic is growing at 20-25% per annum or more, and sleepy 
airports of yester years are now milling with passengers. Till the 1980s it used to be said 
that most of the air traffic in India was the movement of civil servants at public expense. 
Now civil servants constitute only a small fraction of those flying on Indian airlines. 
 
 This recent boom has not been without its problems.   Apart from urban chaos, 
large sections of the population have not benefited significantly from the boom.  Without 
the boom they would probably have been worse off, but that is no consolation. The 
middle and upper middle classes (now about 25% of the population) have gained a great 
deal, and some businessmen have become super-rich, but the far-too-slow trickle down 
the economic ladder has become a serious problem. The government claims that the 
population below the poverty line has now declined. Although the decline itself cannot be 
in doubt the numbers quoted are open to question; the official Indian definition of the 
poverty line is any way so low that there are a lot of poor people even above the line [11]. 
Certainly the gap between the rich and the poor has widened.   
 
 Literacy levels in the country vary widely, from nearly 100% in states like Kerala 
to only about a third among women in states like Bihar.  The national average is just 
barely more than 60%. Water and public health remain problems across the country. 
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There is a chronic shortage of energy, and although innumerable analyses of the problem 
have been made, the country has been unable to meet its needs.  Oil prices rise, loss and 
theft of power in transmission continue, little R&D is done on new technologies (e.g. 
clean-coal, photo-voltaics), and pricing policies offer free power to farmers with the 
power generators being left to resort to some cross-subsidy. Economic growth may in 
coming years be seriously hurt by severe energy shortages. 
 
6. Technology 
 
 There are several questions here that we need to ask ourselves. First, what have 
been the relations between the economic reforms initiated during 1980-2000 and the 
development of science and technology in the nation before and after the reforms?  Did 
the infrastructure of public science and technology built up before 1980 have anything to 
do with the accelerated economic growth of the last few decades?  What of the future? 
  
In strategic technologies other than space, the country has two operational 
missiles designed and manufactured in India, namely the Prithvi and the Agni series. 
There is an Indo-Russian cruise missile called the Brahmos.  We have already mentioned 
Dhruv and the LCA.  The main battle tank Arjun is also now under manufacture. Many of 
these projects have taken a long time to complete; and some (like the LCA) are still on-
going.  A strong policy of self-reliance, the prevalence of international technology denial 
regimes which became stricter after the 1998 nuclear tests and the consequent need to 
develop some crucial technologies from scratch, frequent problems with funding, all 
these have combined to extended project time schedules. 
 
  But the counter examples of space and atomic energy, subject to even stricter 
technology denial than aircraft, demand an explanation for their relatively greater 
success. It appears as if management through a Commission/Department/Organization 
structure and steady support at the highest political levels have favoured the space and 
nuclear sectors. Paradoxically, therefore, long-term technology development programmes 
subjected to the strictest denial regimes have eventually done better than military 
programmes where foreign systems – usually of an earlier generation – have been 
available for import. This is not so much because military requirements have in principle 
to be met on tighter time schedules, but rather because of lack of well-defined make-buy 
policies and inappropriate management structures. The so-called mission agencies have 
gained from formulating very clear goals within a well-formulated long-term perspective 
– sometimes very long indeed.  For example, the thorium-based strategy for nuclear 
energy was proposed by Homi Bhabha in the 1950s, but an operational system is unlikely 
within the next three decades: so we are talking about total time scales approaching a 
century.  The long-term programmes for development of space technology drawn up in 
its initial decade have taken nearly three decades for realization.  But in a way the low-
slow-steady policy has in fact borne fruit. After all, when India’s first commercially 
successful automobile was launched in 1998, there had already been eight Indian-made 
satellites put in orbit on Indian rocket systems.  As another example, there were 
operational parallel computers in the country without a hardware industry, and well 
before the software boom. So there has been a bit of leap-frogging! 
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 What the successful mission agencies have shown is that development and 
deployment of sophisticated technology in India is not only feasible, but can be cost-
effective.  Estimating an overall rate of return for the space programme, for example, is 
not easy, because some of its societal services are offered free (e.g. radio); also capital 
and other facilities available to a government department do not operate at market rates.  
However, a detailed exercise can be carried out in such cases as transponders for 
communication satellites. The conclusion from such a study carried out recently by 
Sankar [12] at the Madras School of Economics is that effective lease charges on an 
ISRO transponder are 64 to 75% of equivalent low-cost transponders available in the 
global market. (The factors are respectively for high- and low-power C-band 
transponders.)  These studies show beyond doubt that India can be competitive in the 
international market for high-technology products. Although the space programme (like 
the nuclear) has not been required to be commercially successful, this does not appear to 
be beyond them, as some of their corporate off-shoots have indeed been profitable. 
Furthermore, such successes in technology delivery suggest that failures in other cases 
are often due to inappropriate management structures and policies, lack of political will, 
commercial non-viability and the seduction of alternative imported systems.  Success in 
India is now policy-limited, not skill-limited. 
 
 In the private sector pharmaceuticals and chemicals have done very well.  The 
automobile industry has shown the capability to come up with advanced designs that can 
withstand competition from foreign brands. Biotechnology and aerospace design (and 
more generally engineering) services are likely to follow suit. 
 
 However, India still relies on import for its more technology-intensive products in 
the large majority of cases, including all civilian and most military aircraft, a variety of 
defence equipment, most automobiles, drugs, computers, communication equipment etc.  
Thus, the successes constitute only a small fraction of the total technology market in the 
country. 
 
 Indeed, the economic reforms have triggered a vast internal migration of skills to 
sectors that are directly in wealth creation, particularly in the export of services. (The 
service sector now accounts for more than 50% of the Indian economy).  So the reforms 
have indeed been successful in this respect! But major new initiatives in science and 
technology, public or private, have been fewer. With rare exceptions, India still remains 
predominantly a recipient rather than source of technology.  Local talent is being 
increasingly used by MNCs and foreign enterprises to develop systems elsewhere that 
might be sold back here.   There is no pressure yet in the present economic system to 
create wealth through technology development and intellectual property generation 
within the country. 
 
7. Basic science 
 
 The national science base is one essential ingredient of an innovative technology 
system. One widely used measure of global standing here is the number of internationally 
recognized publications originating from the country. Table 1 collects some interesting 
statistics. In 1997, the number of publications from China began to match those from 
India, each being less than 5% of the US figures.  In 2006, the numbers for China, India, 
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and the US had gone up by 360%, 60% and 18% respectively. India’s proportional 
contribution to the global scientific literature has for many years stagnated at 
approximately 2 %, while those of Brazil, China and Korea have improved by factors of 
3 to 10 in the last ten years.  In global ranking of impact-making science India is now 
number 22, below China, South Korea and Poland, and far below the US (which is 
number one by a large margin), the major European powers and Japan [13]. 
 
Table 1 also confirms that India is the most cost-effective source of open R&D in 
the world (as it is in successful science-intensive technology development). Comparison 
on an institution-wise basis (not shown here) suggests again that the leading centres of 
academic research are competitive in performance with much better-funded international 
institutions.   
 
India’s investment in R&D is one of the lowest in the world for a major nation: 
about 0.8% of GDP, compared to more than 2.6% in South Korea and the US and 1.3% 
in China.  South Korea is a particularly interesting case for comparison. Its GDP, as well 
as the government’s investment in R&D, are about the same as in India. But the private 
sector in Korea invests twice as much in R&D as the Government does, whereas in India 
it is less than a third.  This indicates that in India neither academia nor industry finds the 
other necessary for its prosperity. Similarly the small number of PhDs in engineering and 
technology is another indicator that most private industry does not depend on local R&D.  
There are however exceptions: there is more private R&D in biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, where India has some international presence. 
 
India has the potential to become a global centre for high-level undergraduate 
education because of its vast experience with the successful IIT system, but national 
efforts in this direction are still very weak.  
 
Table 1 : Some S&T Indicators for Select Countries 
 
Country Total no. of 
publications 
(2006)a, 
(change 
over 1997) 
High-
impact 
publications 
% 
(change)b 
GDP, 
$ T 
(2003)c 
Investment 
in R&D, 
% GDPd 
Investment 
R&D, $ B 
$ M/ 
public-
cation 
PhDs 
in 
E&Te 
per 
year 
USA 451 028 
(+ 18%) 
63%  
(– 4%) 
10.9 2.68% 292.0 0.65 8000 
China 78 671 
(+ 358%) 
0.99% 
(+125%) 
1.42 1.31% 18.6 0.24 9000 
South 
Korea 
 
(+ 290%) 
0.78% 
(+178%) 
0.61 2.64% 16.1 0.60  
India 26 963 
(+ 60%) 
0.54% 
(+69%) 
0.60 0.77% 4.6 0.17 700 
UK ~ 122 000 12.8% 
(+25%) 
1.79 1.89% 33.8 0.28  
aNB          bKing [13]       cNSR [14]    dNSR [14]                 eWadhwa 2007Issues [15] 
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8. The stark contrasts  
 
So on the bright side we have an elite educational system that produces a small 
number of excellent engineering graduates (3,500 selected in competition for the IITs 
from nearly 5,00,000 candidates) at a fraction of the costs in the US, an R&D system that 
produces international publications at the lowest unit cost among major nations, and the 
largest and best space programme in the world in societal applications crafted on a ‘shoe-
string’ budget.  More than 300 MNCs have set up large R&D centres in India to use 
Indian talent [16]. The country has a youthful demographic profile, with more than half 
the population being younger than 30 years.  Young people in India still like to study 
science and engineering.  Indian business is going aggressively global. 
 
 On the dark side, the traditional universities are in bad shape. According to the 
National Assessment and Accreditation Council of the University Grants Commission 
(reporting in 2007 [17]), 90% of the colleges and 68% of the universities are rated 
middling to poor, and 57% of the faculty in colleges have no post-graduate qualifications.  
Many universities cannot even hold examinations on time, and have no credible grading 
systems in place. Industry leaders complain that many engineering graduates are 
unemployable.  The Union Minister for Human Resource Development admitted that 
higher education is a ‘sick child’ [18].  Inaugurating the Indian Science Congress earlier 
this year Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that he was troubled by the decline in the 
standards of research in the universities (and even, he added, in advanced research 
institutes).   
 
In 2001 there were still some 350 million illiterates.  Although there is nearly 
100% enrolment in primary education, drop-out rates are high.   Only 7% of the eligible 
group is enrolled in universities.  Vocational education is neglected: much native talent 
that could be very productive remains untrained in new skills.  
 
 Careers in S&T, especially in a public sector saddled with archaic recruitment and 
assessment policies, are no longer attractive to most young Indians; both junior and 
senior staff are lost every year.   The IITs cannot fill the faculty vacancies they have.   
 
Young talent – even when deeply interested in a particular field of S&T – often 
therefore turns to the more rewarding opportunities that are rapidly opening up outside 
S&T.  For all these reasons the public S&T system in India seems to be heading towards 
a crisis.   Paradoxically, even the private sector industry that needs more scientists and is 
willing to pay well cannot find the right kind of people for their laboratories, so the 
present educational system is not training the right kind of graduates in sufficient 
numbers. 
 
9. The Role of Indian S&T policy 
 
 How has national S&T policy evolved in response to perceived needs and external 
factors over the last sixty years?  Nehru’s scientific policy resolution of 1958 was 
basically a declaration of faith, and promised to promote science, educate and train 
scientists and technical personnel, encourage individual initiative and secure for the 
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country the benefits of scientific knowledge.  Scientists were promised good service 
conditions and an honoured place in advisory roles to government.  The foundations that 
the policy laid led to an S&T infrastructure that was remarkable for its times but is now 
experiencing difficulties. But the slow economic growth that characterized the period 
began to tell: in 1963 Nehru himself said he wanted a society where it was ‘open to every 
person to lead what may be called the Good Life’.  One of Nehru’s constant advisers had 
been the distinguished British physicist and Labour peer Lord Blackett, who in 1967 
warned India that ‘science is no magic wand to wave over a poor country to make it a 
rich one’.  He emphasized the importance of the whole innovation chain – an idea that 
has come to be appreciated only forty years after his report.  
 
 With the advent of Mrs Gandhi as Prime Minister there was greater concern for 
national security. In her addresses to the Science Congress [19] she spoke about 
maintaining independence of judgement and action, and mildly chided the scientific 
community for being ‘unduly influenced by the technological styles of the affluent west’.  
Self-reliance and national strength were the goals of her ‘pilgrimage’ towards science. 
Twenty five years after her father’s scientific policy resolution she announced India’s 
first technology policy statement, whose very first objective was to  
 
attain technological competence and self-reliance to reduce vulnerability, 
particularly in strategic and critical areas, making the maximum use of indigenous 
resources. 
 
 Economic liberalization that started in the 1980s gave more space to private 
industry. The period coincided with the beginning of the computer revolution in India.  
This proceeded apace after 1991.  Formal recognition of these changes had to wait till 
2003, when a new S&T policy was enunciated by the Vajpayee government explicitly 
recognizing the importance of innovation, of involving the private sector and of 
protecting intellectual property rights. The economy became now the centre of attention.   
 
 Have these policy statements any connection with reality?  Certain long-standing 
issues have always been mentioned, but not resolved to this day: water, literacy, energy, 
poverty alleviation are examples. Certain other features have always been implemented, 
irrespective of the party in power: programmes in the strategic sector (the one exception 
here was the Morarji Desai government of 1977-80), agriculture, special new 
technologies like ICT and bio-technology.  Others reflected adjustment to changes that 
occurred without explicit domestic policy initiatives, often in response to global forces; 
e.g. IT, wealth creation, IPR. 
 
10. The Future 
 
 The Indian experience shows how, even within the framework of its political and 
bureaucratic machinery it is possible to build major technological capabilities that can 
deliver.  However, apart from that part of the strategic sector subject to strict technology 
denial regimes, it has been difficult to scale up the underlying national dynamic.  
 
 Computer and internet technologies have made a great impact because they 
revealed to Indian engineers a field where their culturally inherited skills matched those 
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in global demand.  Coupled with the advantages of living on the other side of the world 
from the US, enabling work round the clock and globe, IT created a large number of 
lucrative jobs for an educated middle class that had been starved of opportunities.  So, 
perhaps for the first time in the country’s history, knowledge of a certain kind could be 
converted to wealth with relative ease, provided only that one was willing to work hard.   
 
 Indian skills have been chiefly tested and used only in IT services.  The hardware 
industry is weak, and even the software side has found it more profitable to help foreign 
businesses run better. Industry finds it easier to create wealth by manufacturing to 
imported designs, and has not found it necessary to undertake much technology 
development, by itself or in league with R&D and academia. Even those who do not take 
easily to software development find that the salary sacrifices demanded by public S&T 
are unacceptably high.  A telling instance is provided by the response of young people to 
the biennial air shows in Bangalore.  On the public days the Yelahanka air base where the 
show is held is filled with excited young boys and girls, thrilled by the aircraft on static 
and flying displays. Few of them however seek aeronautics as a profession, for it is 
unattractive in remuneration, and is dominated by a bureaucratic public sector.  Similarly 
the widespread liking (about 30%) for mathematics among the young [20] does not 
translate to careers in the subject. An unanticipated effect of the reforms has therefore 
been to weaken public S&T. 
  
On the whole, the public Indian S&T system has not been directly benefited yet by 
the economic reforms. The josh, the exuberant and aggressive confidence that 
characterizes Indian business (who have a regime they are happy with) has not yet 
touched the scientists.  Although one sees innumerable examples of innovation in daily 
life – from marketing to fixing things to getting things done in a difficult bureaucracy, the 
overall climate for high-level technological innovation is still lacking.   If the country 
wishes to move away from being a mere blue-collar S&T force and become instead a 
source of innovative technology, not just a recipient, another shift in the S&T policy 
regime is necessary.  Such a shift has to take into account the new realities of a rapidly 
growing, globalizing economy. The most important change that is required is the creation 
of effective networks involving academia, government and business to promote 
innovation.  Perhaps things are changing: the Indian automobile industry is conceiving 
and developing its first innovative products.  
 
To remove the shackles on education and R&D so that the innate innovative 
energies of the people are released, a more integrated view of national S&T is needed, 
cutting across fields but serving a clearly stated, easily understandable national goal. 
Such a goal might be the emergence of India as a developed nation or a harmonious 
society or a renewed civilization, with a specific definition of what would constitute that 
achievement.  Many components of such a goal would be social, but those that involve 
S&T and the economy might include the following:  
 
 Making India a middle-income country on a per capita basis (average income of 
order US $ 3000 per year at current rates), and at least the world’s third largest 
economy in national terms. 
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 Literacy rates exceeding 90% across the country, irrespective of caste, religion, 
gender. 
 
 Guaranteed university education to all who pass a national eligibility test, 
supported by a massive system of fellowships (funded largely by private industry) 
to all who are in need of material support for carrying on with their education. 
 
 A diverse, more flexible education system, welcoming private investment, 
separately or in partnership with the public sector, with disproportionately 
generous tax incentives for large investments. 
 
 Encouragement of close links between academic and industrial research, through 
attractive matching grants, and of innovation, by enabling talent to move easily 
across the country and the globe, and between academia and business. 
 
 An economic liberalization of the S&T system, with an extensive performance-
linked reward system, and encouragement of faculty setting up their own 
technology enterprises (subject to appropriate monitoring mechanisms that chiefly 
demand transparency). 
 
 An imaginative and comprehensive plan for creating an S&T ecosystem, and a 
complete innovation chain including the banking system, with high rewards for 
successful technologies developed with substantial contributions from within the 
country; in particular, a special system for helping the end-game in product 
development. 
 
 An honoured place for basic research, with a system of higher remuneration for 
academic scientists combined with generous awards for outstanding performance. 
 
 Establishment of world-class universities where undergraduate and post-graduate 
education are combined with the highest international standards in research, and 
significant faculty strength in relevant social sciences. 
 
If major initiatives along the above lines cannot be taken, there is every likelihood of 
India remaining an efficient blue-collar S&T nation that provides R&D services that help 
more aggressive innovators elsewhere in the world, from one side an outsourcing of 
services being matched by a corresponding outsourcing of innovation from the other.   
 
  Fortunately, there are indications that education is beginning to get the attention it 
needs. And Indian industry is slowly moving up the innovation chain, based on work in 
India in some cases and on technology acquired from abroad (through corporate mergers 
and acquisitions even) in others. There are outstanding innovators in India – but their 
numbers are still too small. Perhaps India is in another time of transition. 
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